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Abstract
According to Penrose, the fundamental conflict between the superposi-
tion principle of quantum mechanics and the general covariance principle
of general relativity entails the existence of wavefunction collapse, e.g. a
quantum superposition of two different space-time geometries will collapse
to one of them due to the ill-definedness of the time-translation operator
for the superposition. In this paper, we argue that Penrose’s conjecture on
gravity’s role in wavefunction collapse is debatable. First of all, it is still
a controversial issue what the exact nature of the conflict is and how to
resolve it. Secondly, Penrose’s argument by analogy is too weak to estab-
lish a necessary connection between wavefunction collapse and the conflict
as understood by him. Thirdly, the conflict does not necessarily lead to
wavefunction collapse. For the conflict or the problem of ill-definedness for
a superposition of different space-time geometries also needs to be solved
before the collapse of the superposition finishes, and once the conflict has
been resolved, the wavefunction collapse will lose its physical basis relat-
ing to the conflict. In addition, we argue that Penrose’s suggestions for
the collapse time formula and collapse states are also problematic.
In standard quantum mechanics, it is postulated that when the wave func-
tion of a quantum system is measured by a macroscopic device, it no longer
follows the linear Schro¨dinger equation, but instantaneously collapses to one of
the wave functions that correspond to definite measurement results. However,
this collapse postulate is not satisfactory, as it does not explain why and how
the wave function collapses during a measurement. There have been various
conjectures on the origin of wavefunction collapse, and the most promising one
is Penrose’s gravity-induced collapse argument (Penrose 1996). In this paper,
we will present a critical analysis of Penrose’s trenchant argument.
It seems very natural to guess the collapse of the wave function is induced by
gravity. The reasons include: (1) gravity is the only universal force being present
in all physical interactions; (2) gravitational effects grow with the size of the
objects concerned, and it is in the context of macroscopic objects that linear
superpositions may be violated. The gravity-induced collapse conjecture can
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be traced back to Feynman (1995)1. In his Lectures on Gravitation, Feynman
considered the philosophical problems in quantizing macroscopic objects and
contemplates on a possible breakdown of quantum theory. He said, “I would
like to suggest that it is possible that quantum mechanics fails at large distances
and for large objects, it is not inconsistent with what we do know. If this failure
of quantum mechanics is connected with gravity, we might speculatively expect
this to happen for masses such that GM2/~c = 1, of M near 10−5 grams.”
Partly inspired by Feynman’s suggestion, Penrose proposed a concrete gravity-
induced collapse argument (Penrose 1996). The argument is based on a fun-
damental conflict between the superposition principle of quantum mechanics
and the general covariance principle of general relativity. The conflict can be
seen by considering the superposition state of a static mass distribution in two
different locations, say position A and position B. On the one hand, according
to quantum mechanics, the valid definition of such a superposition requires the
existence of a definite space-time background, in which position A and position
B can be distinguished. On the other hand, according to general relativity, the
space-time geometry, including the distinguishability of position A and position
B, cannot be predetermined, and must be dynamically determined by the posi-
tion superposition state. Since the different position states in the superposition
determine different space-time geometries, the space-time geometry determined
by the whole superposition state is indefinite, and as a result, the superposition
and its evolution cannot be consistently defined. In particular, the definition
of the time-translation operator for the superposed space-time geometries in-
volves an inherent ill-definedness, and this leads to an essential uncertainty in
the energy of the superposed state. Then by analogy Penrose argued that this
superposition, like an unstable particle in usual quantum mechanics, is also
unstable, and it will decay or collapse into one of the two states in the super-
position after a finite lifetime. Moreover, Penrose suggested that the essential
energy uncertainty in the Newtonian limit is proportional to the gravitational
self-energy E∆ of the difference between the two mass distributions, and the
collapse time, analogous to the half-life of an unstable particle, is
T ≈ ~/E∆ (1)
This criterion is very close to that put forward by Dio´si (1989) earlier, and
it is usually called the Dio´si-Penrose criterion. Later, Penrose (1998) further
suggested that the collapse states are the stationary solutions of the Schro¨dinger-
Newton equation.
Now let’s examine Penrose’s gravity-induced collapse argument in detail.
The crux of the argument is whether the conflict between quantum mechanics
and general relativity requires that a quantum superposition of two space-time
geometries must collapse after a finite time. We will argue in the following
that the answer is negative. First of all, although it is widely acknowledged
that there exists a fundamental conflict between the superposition principle of
quantum mechanics and the general covariance principle of general relativity,
it is still a controversial issue what the exact nature of the conflict is and how
to solve it. For example, it is possible that the conflict may be solved by
1It is worth noting that Feynman considered this conjecture even earlier at the 1957 Chapel
Hill conference (DeWitt and Rickles 2011, ch.22).
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reformulating quantum mechanics in a way that does not rely on a definite
spacetime background (see, e.g. Rovelli 2011).
Secondly, Penrose’s argument by analogy seems too weak to establish a nec-
essary connection between wavefunction collapse and the conflict between gen-
eral relativity and quantum mechanics. Even though there is an essential uncer-
tainty in the energy of the superposition of different space-time geometries, this
kind of energy uncertainty is different in nature from the energy uncertainty of
unstable particles or unstable states in usual quantum mechanics (Gao 2010).
The former results from the ill-definedness of the time-translation operator for
the superposed space-time geometries (and its nature seems still unclear), while
the latter exists in a definite spacetime background, and there is a well-defined
time-translation operator for the unstable states. Moreover, the decay of an
unstable state (e.g. an excited state of an atom) is a natural result of the linear
Schro¨dinger evolution, and the process is not random but deterministic. In par-
ticular, the decay process is not spontaneous but caused by the background field
constantly interacting with the unstable state, e.g. the state may not decay at
all when in a very special background field with bandgap (Yablonovitch 1987).
By contrast, the hypothetical decay or collapse of the superposed space-time
geometries is spontaneous, nonlinear and random. In short, there exists no con-
vincing analogy between a superposition of different space-time geometries and
an unstable state in usual quantum mechanics. Accordingly, one cannot argue
for the collapse of the superposition of different space-time geometries by this
analogy. Although an unstable state in quantum mechanics may decay after a
very short time, this does not imply that a superposition of different space-time
geometries should also decay - and, again, sometimes an unstable state does not
decay at all under special circumstances. To sum up, Penrose’s argument by
analogy only has a very limited force, and it is not strong enough to establish
a necessary connection between wavefunction collapse and the conflict between
quantum mechanics and general relativity.
Thirdly, it can be further argued that the conflict between quantum mechan-
ics and general relativity does not necessarily lead to wavefunction collapse. The
key is to realize that the conflict also needs to be resolved before the wavefunc-
tion collapse finishes, and when the conflict has been resolved, the wavefunction
collapse will lose its basis relating to the conflict. As argued by Penrose, a
quantum superposition of different space-time geometries and its evolution are
both ill-defined due to the fundamental conflict between the general covari-
ance principle of general relativity and the superposition principle of quantum
mechanics. The ill-definedness seems to require that the superposition must
collapse into one of the definite space-time geometries, which has no problem
of ill-definedness. However, the wavefunction collapse seems too late to save
the superposition from the “suffering” of the ill-definedness during the collapse.
In the final analysis, the conflict or the problem of ill-definedness needs to be
solved before defining a quantum superposition of different space-time geome-
tries and its evolution. In particular, the possible collapse evolution of the
superposition also needs to be consistently defined, which again indicates that
the wavefunction collapse does not solve the problem of ill-definedness. On the
other hand, once the problem of ill-definedness is solved and a consistent de-
scription obtained (however this is still an unsolved issue in quantum gravity),
3
the wavefunction collapse will lose its connection with the problem2. Therefore,
contrary to Penrose’s expectation, it seems that the conflict between quantum
mechanics and general relativity does not entail the existence of wavefunction
collapse.
Even though Penrose’s gravity-induced collapse argument may be problem-
atic, it is still possible that the wavefunction collapse is a real physical process
(Gao 2011). Therefore, Penrose’s suggestions for the collapse time formula and
collapse states also need to be examined as some aspects of a phenomenological
model. To begin with, let’s analyze Penrose’s collapse time formula Eq. (1),
according to which the collapse time of a superposition of two mass distribu-
tions is inversely proportional to the gravitational self-energy of the difference
between the two mass distributions. As we have argued above, the analogy
between such a superposition and an unstable state in quantum mechanics does
not exist, and gravity does not necessarily induce wavefunction collapse either.
Thus this collapse time formula, which is based on a similar application of
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle to unstable states, will lose its original phys-
ical basis. In particular, the appearance of the gravitational self-energy term in
the formula is in want of a reasonable explanation (see below). In fact, it has
already been shown that this gravitational self-energy term does not represent
the ill-definedness of time-translation operator in the strictly Newtonian regime
(Christian 2001). In this regime, the time-translation operator can be well de-
fined, but the gravitational self-energy term is not zero. Besides, as Dio´si (2007)
pointed out, the microscopic formulation of Penrose’s collapse time formula also
meets the cut-off difficulty.
Next, let’s examine Penrose’s suggestion for the collapse states. Accord-
ing to Penrose (1998), the collapse states are the stationary solutions of the
Schro¨dinger-Newton equation:
i~
∂ψ(x, t)
∂t
= − ~
2
2m
∇2ψ(x, t)−Gm2
∫ |ψ(x′, t)|2
|x− x′| d
3x′ψ(x, t) + V ψ(x, t), (2)
where m is the mass of a quantum system, V is an external potential, G is
Newton’s gravitational constant. The equation describes the gravitational self-
interaction of a single quantum system, in which the mass density m|ψ(x, t)|2 is
the source of the classical gravitational potential. As we have argued in a previ-
ous paper (Gao 2011), although a quantum system has a mass distribution that
is measurable by protective measurement, the distribution is not real but effec-
tive; it is formed by the ergodic motion of a localized particle with the total mass
of the system. Therefore, there does not exist a gravitational self-interaction of
the mass distribution. This conclusion can also be reached by another some-
what different argument. Since charge always accompanies mass for a charged
2Note that if the problem of ill-definedness cannot be solved in principle for the superposi-
tions of very different space-time geometries, then the wavefunction collapse may be relevant
here. Concretely speaking, if the superpositions of very different space-time geometries cannot
be consistently defined even in principle, then these superpositions cannot exist and they must
have collapsed into one of the definite space-time geometries before being formed from the
superpositions of minutely different space-time geometries. In this case, the large difference
of the space-time geometries in the superposition will set an upper limit for wavefunction
collapse. Though the limit may be loose, it does imply the existence of wavefunction collapse.
However, this possibility may be very small, as it seems that there is always some kind of
approximate sense in which two different spacetimes can be pointwise identified.
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particle such as an electron3, the existence of the gravitational self-interaction,
though which is too weak to be excluded by present experiments (Salzman and
Carlip 2006), entails the existence of a remarkable electrostatic self-interaction
of the particle, which already contradicts experiments (Gao 2011). This analy-
sis poses a serious objection to the Schro¨dinger-Newton equation and Penrose’s
suggestion for the collapse states4.
Lastly, we briefly discuss another two potential problems of Penrose’s col-
lapse scheme. The first one is the origin of the randomness of collapse results.
Penrose did not consider this issue. If the collapse is indeed spontaneous as
implied by his gravity-induced collapse argument, then the randomness cannot
result from any external influences such as an external noise field, and it can
only come from the studied quantum system and its wave function (Gao 2011).
The second problem is energy non-conservation. Although Penrose did not give
a concrete model of wavefunction collapse, he thought that the energy uncer-
tainty E∆ may cover such a potential non-conservation, leading to no actual
violation of energy conservation (Penrose 2004). However, Dio´si (2007) pointed
out that the von-Neumann-Newton equation, which may be regarded as one
realization of Penrose’s collapse scheme, does not conserve the energy. If the
principle of conservation of energy is indeed universal as widely thought, then
the spontaneous collapse models that violate energy conservation will have been
excluded5.
To sum up, we have argued that Penrose’s argument for gravity’s role in
wavefunction collapse is debatable. However, it is still possible that the wave-
function collapse is a real physical process, though its origin remains a deep
mystery.
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